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Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality 
and Budget Allocation in the European Union†
By Kai Gehring and Stephan A. Schneider*
We demonstrate that the nationalities of EU Commissioners influence 
budget allocation decisions in favor of their country of origin. Our 
focus is on the Commissioners for Agriculture, who are exclusively 
responsible for a specific fund that accounts for the largest share 
of the overall EU budget. On average, providing the Commissioner 
causes a 1 percentage point increase in a country’s share of the 
overall EU budget, which corresponds to 850 million euros per year. 
There are no different pretreatment trends and the magnitude of the 
bias from selection-on-unobservables would have to be implausibly 
high to account for the estimated coefficient. (JEL D72, F55, H61, 
H77)
Article 17, Treaty on European Union (TEU):
“The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. (…) In carrying out its responsibili-
ties, the Commission shall be completely independent. (…) (T )he mem-
bers of the Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions from any 
Government or other institution, body, office or entity .”(European Union 2010)
For the past 60 years, the European Union (EU) and its predecessors have pushed toward an ever closer union among member states, accumulating power espe-
cially in the European Commission (EC), as the executive arm of the European gov-
erning system. The central role of the EC places it at the center of the raging political 
debate over the future of the EU. Those pushing for more integration seek an EU 
with its own fully functional executive, typically in the form of an EC with enhanced 
powers. At the same time, others advocating for a return of decision-making powers 
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to national governments (or even for an exit from the EU) complain that the EC 
 suffers from a “democratic deficit” and a lack of political accountability. In this 
paper, we shed light on the issues underlying this debate by studying the behavior of 
the EC, more specifically the influence of nationality on decision-making in the EC.
The EC comprises currently 28 Commissioners from all EU member states who 
can exert considerable political influence and oversee an administrative body of 
altogether about 23,000 bureaucrats. While the EC resembles the executive board of 
an international organization or central bank in the process by which Commissioners 
are appointed, its role and competencies also make it comparable to the executive 
arm of government. It is thus not clear to what extent Commissioners behave as other 
politicians do. The decision-making of Commissioners has not been systematically 
explored before.1 While there is a vast amount of related literature on  log-rolling 
and state-specific spending related to political interests in the United States, mostly 
only placing emphasis on the legislative chambers (e.g., Gawande and Hoekman 
2006; Brooks, Cameron, and Carter 1998; Stratmann 1992), barely any such work 
has been done for the EU (Aksoy 2012). In addition, there is very little work on 
these issues that focuses on the executive branch, as does this study.
The designers of the EC were aware of the potential for national self-dealing. 
Unlike the United States, the EU is more similar to an international organization 
than to a state. It has installed several institutional specificities and a bureaucracy 
strongly mixed in nationality aimed at reducing the influence of individual national 
backgrounds. As the opening statement indicates, the EC, as the main executive body 
of the EU, is eager to maintain an image of simply representing “the interests of the 
EU as a whole” (European Commission 2016). The EU portrays its Commissioners 
as working independently, unaffected by their cultural and national background to 
pursue the “common good” of their respective principal constituents. However, it is 
unclear to what extent these attempts are successful. There is evidence that national-
ity continues to play a role in shaping actors’ decision-making in other international 
organizations like the European Central Bank, credit rating agencies, or the United 
Nations (see, e.g., Fuchs and Gehring 2017; Kaja and Werker 2010; Novosad and 
Werker 2014; Sturm and Wollmershäuser 2008). Thus, it remains an open and unre-
solved question whether the EU succeeds in overcoming these features inherent to 
comparable institutions.
Even without examining the data, there are good reasons to expect that EU 
Commissioners favor their home countries. Member states actively engage in an 
effort to acquire seemingly attractive Commissioner posts for “their” Commissioner, 
suggesting that such positions are valuable (cf. description in Napel and Widgrén 
2008; Nugent 2001). Furthermore, former Commissioners often gain import-
ant positions in their home country after their term in Brussels, so that rational 
Commissioners may, to some degree, take their or their parties’ future electorate 
and career prospects into account (Vaubel, Klingen, and Müller 2012). Consider, 
1 There is a simple reason why the literature so far has not been able to provide an assessment of the influence of 
nationality on EU Commissioners’ behavior. The EU publishes no detailed data on the specific budget of individual 
Commissioners’ portfolios, which would allow a decomposition into country specific spending. We solve this chal-
lenge by using the allocation of EU funds instead, focusing on the Commissioner for Agriculture, who is the only 
Commissioner exclusively responsible for one specific fund. 
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for instance, the official portfolio description of the Commissioner for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, which emphasizes the responsibility “for (e)nsuring enforce-
ment of the Stability and Growth Pact and reviewing its fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance legislation (…) and budgetary rules” (European Commission 2017). 
Nevertheless, the current Commissioner, Pierre Moscovici, a former national minis-
ter in France, was one of the first to sign a request from the French Socialist Party for 
communitization of national government debt on the European level. This caused 
massive controversies among member states and suggests that member states have 
vested interests in their Commissioners’ behavior.2
This study focuses on the European Commissioner for Agriculture, who exercises 
authority over the budget allocation of the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). Since its inception, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) has been among the most important pillars of the EU’s work and consumed 
up to 70 percent of the overall EU budget (Butzen, De Prest, and Geeroms 2006). 
The related fund budget decisions are of high political salience (cf., Schneider 2013) 
and the Commissioner can influence the budgetary process as an agenda setter or 
due to information advantages.3 Thus, if national background matters, we can plau-
sibly expect it to manifest itself in the distribution of the EAGGF.
In order to identify the impact of nationality on budget decisions, we employ 
a  difference-in-differences and event-study approach with country and time 
 fixed-effects. If some countries are constantly less likely to provide the Commissioner, 
country fixed-effects suffice in avoiding selection bias. In addition, we remedy the 
most obvious selection problem by showing specifications that exclude the largest 
member states, with potentially less interest in holding this position, as well as consec-
utively excluding each treated member state individually. Conditional on controlling 
for relevant selection factors, there is a significant positive relationship between the 
Commissioners’ country of origin and the agricultural fund spending these countries 
receive during their terms in office. This translates on average into about 850 million 
euros per year for the country of origin of the respective Commissioner.
We test for a number of potential threats to identification. Most importantly, 
a consistent estimation of the average treatment effect in our set-up relies on the 
assumption of parallel trends between treated and untreated states. We find no signs 
of problematic pretreatment and posttreatment trends when we add lead and lag 
variables. The sharpness of the response suggests further that dynamic selection 
is unlikely to explain our results. In addition, the results remain robust when we 
account for potentially differential developments with country-specific time trends. 
Any remaining selection-on-unobservables would have to be between one and 
nearly five times as strong as selection on the comprehensive set of observable fac-
tors to account for the positive relationship (cf., Oster 2013; Altonji, Elder, and 
Taber 2005). A final potential threat to identification is the relatively low share of 
2  ht tps: / /magazin.spiegel .de/digi tal /?utm_source=spon&utm_campaign=inhaltsverzeichnis
#SP/2015/19/134762470 (last accessed on May 15, 2015). We document some more details on the selection 
process in Online Appendix A1. 
3 Farmers usually constitute a well-organized lobby group (see, e.g., Olson 1965), which can set incentives for 
the respective national governments to lobby on their behalf or for the Commissioners to take account of their future 
support if they consider returning to national politics in the future. 
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treated observations, which could lead to an overrejection of the null hypothesis. We 
use wild cluster bootstrap procedures and the distribution of placebo treatments to 
derive alternative p-values, which support the significant relationship.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I summarizes the relevant literature 
and Section II shortly explains the structure of the EU Commission with its mem-
bers. Subsequently, it outlines why examining the Commissioner for Agriculture 
and the directly related agricultural fund provides a promising opportunity to assess 
the effect of nationality on budget allocation decisions in the EU. In Section III, we 
describe the data and our empirical strategy. Section IV presents the main results 
and robustness checks and Section V concludes.
I. Related Literature
A. Leader Origin and Distributive Financial Decision making
Our paper relates to the literature on the effects of national and regional identity 
or ethnicity on political decisions and budget allocations (e.g., Franck and Rainer 
2012; Jennes and Persyn 2015), which shows that regions providing national minis-
ters or other important political representatives tend to receive more transfers. Dreher 
et al. (2015), for instance, use a newly developed database that coded Chinese devel-
opment finance projects across 3,545 locations in Africa over the 2000–2012 period 
to investigate how African leaders redirect development aid toward their home 
region. In a similar vein, but with a worldwide focus, Hodler and Raschky (2014) 
use a panel of 38,427 subnational regions from 126 countries over the 1992–2009 
period to study whether political leaders favor their birth region. Likewise, Dreher 
et al. (2009) point out how the individual background of political leaders affects 
the reforms they implement and Jones and Olken (2005) show that leaders have a 
great level of influence on the economic performance of their country. Furthermore, 
the literature on money allocation in international organizations and politics (e.g., 
Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Kuziemko and Werker 2006) demonstrates the 
benefits for countries to hold key positions. Based on the existing evidence, it is thus 
evident that the roles of individuals have to be taken into account when analyzing 
political and economic processes.
More specifically, we also relate to a large literature on European institutions, 
which mostly focuses on the Council of the European Union, and EU politics 
in general (for an overview see, e.g., Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht 2005; 
Baldwin and Wyplosz 2012).4 Aksoy (2010) shows an influence of voting power 
and  agenda-setting on the allocation of the EU budget (see also Kauppi and Widgrén 
2004). In a similar vein, Rodden (2002, 170) states that “empirical analysis demon-
strates a close connection between the distribution of votes and fiscal transfers in 
the legislative institutions of the European Union.” Schneider (2013) finds that 
4 Together with the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, sometimes also referred to as 
the Council of Ministers, forms the EU’s legislative. Depending on the policy area, the Council meets in different 
compositions because all member states dispatch their respective national ministers who are responsible for each 
portfolio. 
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 member states receive larger shares of the EU budget in the years prior to domestic 
 elections. Moreover, Carnegie and Marinov (2017) show that former colonies of 
countries who hold the Council Presidency obtain significantly more foreign aid. 
Aksoy (2010) and Mazumder, McNamara, and Vreeland (2013) present arguments 
and empirical evidence suggesting that holding the rotating EU Council Presidency 
can be used to achieve the respective country’s strategic interests. While there exist 
many papers detecting such relations for legislative bodies, barely any work has 
been done to investigate the role of an executive institution in an international orga-
nization. We also build on recent, mostly qualitative work, which started to examine 
the behavior of the individual actors who form the EC (see for instance Smith 2003; 
Wonka 2007), by assessing the influence of the EU Commissioners for Agriculture 
on the share of EU spending received by their home countries quantitatively.
II. Institutional Setting
A. European Commission
The Commissioners’ influence on the EU budget distribution has, to the best 
of our knowledge, not been systematically examined in the existing literature. Yet, 
theoretical literature indicates that Commissioners are potentially influential in 
every phase of the legislative process (Bachtler and Mendez 2007; Tömmel 2014). 
The European Commission is the main executive and administrative organ of the 
EU. Its wide range of functions includes an exclusive right for policy initiation, 
implementation, and monitoring (cf., König and Mäder 2014), as well as control 
over EU programs, mediation between the member states’ governments, and exter-
nal representation tasks (Egeberg 2010). It is organized in a cabinet structure and 
Commissioners are—comparable to national ministers—responsible for a certain 
portfolio and in most cases related to one specific “Directorate General” in the com-
mission’s administrative section.5 The appointment of the 27 Commissioners fol-
lows the principle: one country, one Commissioner. However, it is the President 
of the EC who assigns the portfolios to the Commissioner candidates, which often 
results in unexpected portfolio allocations (Nugent 2001). As outlined in Online 
Appendix A1, it is common that the specific choices remain unclear until the day of 
the announcement, making the final allocation of the Commissioner positions close 
to random.
One can observe that, in contrast to past terms, member states nowadays increas-
ingly delegate high-ranked politicians (e.g., former national ministers) and mem-
bers of the governing party as Commissioners to Brussels (Egeberg 2010; Döring 
2007). According to Wonka (2007), 67.4 percent of the Commissioners, chosen by 
the member states from 1958 to 2006, came from the governing party and only 
18.1 percent from the opposition. This suggests a principal-agent structure (Vaubel 
2006; Wonka 2007), where governments select reliable actors who are expected 
to take national interests into account at the EU-level (Wonka 2007). Although 
5 See also http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019_en (last accessed on May 4, 2015) for details on the EC. 
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national governments have weaker means of exerting pressure and controlling 
the EC’s  decisions in the postnomination phase (Vaubel 2006), career-prospects 
(e.g., getting a leading position in national politics or elsewhere as a reward), and 
the option to be renominated for the lucrative job are potential incentives to keep 
the country of origin’s (government’s) policy preferences in mind (Döring 2007; 
Vaubel, Klingen, and Müller 2012). In line with these arguments, Vaubel, Klingen, 
and Müller (2012, 59) demonstrate how many Commissioners systematically plan 
their “life after the commission”; in their sample, they find that 36 percent change to 
the private sector or lobby groups and 43 percent return to national politics.
This political self-interest and the fact that candidates for the position are chosen 
by the national governments suggests the possibility of potential conflicts of inter-
est (Tömmel 2014).6 On the one hand, all Commissioners owe their position to a 
system of proportional national representation and a proposal of “their” national 
government, but, on the other hand, they are supposed to act independently and in 
the “general interest” (TEU). This conflict of interests casts doubts on initial studies 
in political science, which often described the commission as a unitary technocratic 
actor pursuing interests distinct from those of member states, and supports authors 
like Wonka (2007), who have more recently questioned this assumption. He deems 
it rather unlikely that the delegates, who are assumed to act like politicians, will col-
lectively turn against the governments that once helped them take office. Thomson 
(2008) supports this notion by showing that Commissioners share the policy posi-
tions of the government of their country of origin.
The Economist remarks that it is “one of the better jokes in Brussels” that 
Commissioners are “completely independent” of their home countries, which can 
be supported by anecdotal evidence.7 In 2007 and 2008, German Commissioner 
for Enterprise and Industry Günter Verheugen repeatedly opposed a planned com-
mission proposal to reduce new car’s carbon dioxide emissions. His success in 
weakening the initial proposal was widely perceived as support for the car industry, 
one of Germany’s most important economic sectors.8 Another example illustrates 
that nominated candidates do consider the promotion of national interests part of 
their task. Before taking office in 2014, Ve˘ra Jourová, the current Commissioner 
for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, was asked about her aims as the new 
Czech EU Commissioner. She said that “(t)he European Commissioner must, of 
course, be impartial, without regard to national interests. Beyond this, however, I 
would like to focus on coordinating the activities of Czech people in EU institutions 
to promote Czech national interests—after my working hours, if you will.” 9
6 Current outside earnings could also create conflicts of interests. Focusing on members of the German 
Bundestag, Arnold, Kauder, and Potrafke (2014) find no clear relationship between outside earnings and parlia-
mentary effort. In the context of two German cities, Potrafke (2013) provides another example of the relationship 
between voter preferences and public spending in a principal-agent structure. 
7 See The Economist under http://www.economist.com/node/10171795 (last accessed on April 28, 2015). 
8 See Deutschlandfunk for the translated direct quote under http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/autolobby-contra-
klimaschutz.724.de.html?dram:article_id=98703 (last accessed on April 28, 2015) and EU Observer under https://
euobserver.com/economic/25453 (last accessed on April 28, 2015). 
9 For the direct quotation see radio Praha under http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/minister-vera-
jourova-nominated-for-czech-eu-commissioner (last accessed on April 30, 2015), written July 21, 2014. 
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B. Identifying the Link between Commissioners and Budget Items
Despite these studies and anecdotal evidence, it is not clear whether the above 
examples constitute exceptions or can be supported by systematic empirical evi-
dence. To be able to identify this relationship, it is of particular interest to con-
sider the role, room to maneuver, and power of the Commissioners in the legislative 
process. The commission’s most relevant power is its monopolistic position as the 
agenda setter, characterized by an exclusive privilege to make legislative, budgetary, 
and program proposals in areas that fall under EU responsibility (Article 17, TEU). It 
can decide, on the whole, whether to take up policy propositions from the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council or not (Bachtler and Mendez 2007; Egeberg 2010): 
“The Council, the EP and member states may make suggestions to the Commission 
and can call on the Commission to present new proposals, but it is the European 
Commission that actually drafts proposals” (van Roozendaal, Hosli, and Heetman 
2012, 449). As a consequence, the commission can exert influence by defining 
“the terms in which issues are discussed” (Thomson and Hosli 2006, 397).10
In the run-up to the introduction of a new policy proposal, the Commissioners 
try to anticipate and consider possible supporting coalitions in the Council or EP. 
As “interface managers” (Tömmel 2014, 152), it is their task to mediate between 
the legislative organs and to find compromises with majority appeal. According 
to Thomson and Hosli (2006), the Commissioners are also continuously involved 
in discussions in the Council, and negotiations between the EP and the European 
Council. In addition to organizing majorities in the Council or EP, they also need to 
win the support of their colleagues in the commission. Hence, it is common prac-
tice to do “package deals” (Tömmel 2014, 152) in order to gain enough support for 
one’s proposal. Nevertheless, the intra-commission decision-making process is a 
first  control-level that might limit the ability of individual Commissioners to pursue 
their own agendas.
It seems plausible that Commissioners would use their informational advantages 
vis-à-vis the EP and the member states’ representatives in the Council (Döring 
2007; Thomson and Hosli 2006). These advantages are derived, for example, from 
the staff of their associated Directoral General or their consultations with exter-
nal experts and acquisition of information from interest groups in the early stages 
of the legislative process. As a consequence, the commission, which takes part in 
Council meetings, can try to forge political deals. Likewise, Commissioners suppos-
edly have informational advantages (albeit in a weaker form) in negotiations with 
other Commissioners (Thomson 2008) when decisions in their field of activities are 
made. The decision-making process at these meetings and negotiations is opaque, 
however, and only scarcely documented; thus not allowing a systematic analysis of 
the relationship we are interested in. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no 
data that allows for the decomposition of individual Commissioners’ budgets so that 
10 Empirical evidence about the budgetary impact of such proposal powers is provided by Knight (2005). 
Investigating the allocation of transportation projects in the United States in 1991 and 1998, he finds that congres-
sional districts, which have a member on the transportation authorization committee and thus possess proposal 
power, receive significantly more project spending than districts without a member on this committee. 
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they may be compared to the shares that each member country receives. The only 
data that are available in the necessary form relate to the various funds that the EU 
manages.
C. Commissioner for Agriculture
We focus on the EU Commissioner for Agriculture, the one case where an indi-
vidual Commissioner is solely responsible for payments from a specific fund, 
namely the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). This 
fund is the main pillar of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and came into force 
in 1962. Up until now, the agricultural fund has made up the greatest part of the 
EU’s overall expenditures (cf. Figure 1). In spite of two substantial reforms of the 
CAP in 1992 and 2003 that gradually shifted the EU’s agricultural expenditure from 
guaranteeing price support for agricultural products to individual direct payments 
for farms (decoupling), and rural development programs (Baldwin and Wyplosz 
2012; Fouilleux 2010), the EAGGF was allocated consistently annually until 2007.
The CAP scheme is particularly well-suited to analyze the relationship between 
national background and budget allocation. It has a redistributional nature and pro-
vides a classic example of pork barrel politics (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 
1981), where each country supposedly aims to acquire as many fund resources 
as possible. The CAP is a major and salient budgetary item in the overall budget. 
Agricultural expenditure 
(excluding guidance section)
Structural funds and cohesion fund
Research
Foreign policy, pre-accession support
and European Development Fund
Administration
Remainder
100
80
60
40
20
0
100
80
60
40
20
0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
Figure 1. EU Budget Structure
Note: Structure of EU expenditures, as percentages of the total budget. 
Source: European Commission, adapted from Butzen, De Prest, and Geeroms (2006)
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Hence, it is plausible that member states are interested in trying to make use of 
“their” Commissioner as their popularity with the electorate at home can depend 
on their bargaining performance (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2012; Schneider 2013).11
A precise description of the annual CAP budget negotiations, which take place a 
year ahead of the actual budget year, is provided by Fouilleux (2010, 344):
“CAP decision-making usually begins with a proposal from the Commission (…). The Agricultural Council meets monthly, more frequently than most 
of the EU Councils. One of these meetings was usually set aside to discuss 
what was called the ‘price package’ for the following year, at which the 
member states decided on such issues as the level of guaranteed prices for 
each product and the amount of quota by country” (Fouilleux 2010, 344).
All meetings offer possibilities to directly (e.g., via price setting or the definition 
of subsidies) or indirectly (e.g., via new regulations or policies) influence the distri-
bution of the agricultural budget.12 Accordingly, the Agricultural Commissioner has 
multiple opportunities to influence budget distribution at various times in the year 
that go beyond gaining leverage through the EC’s budget proposals. Negotiating 
“price packages,” their agenda-setting position, and information advantages can be 
used to redirect funds.
The requirements for reliable identification of a causal relationship that we for-
mulated above are only partly fulfilled by two of the other Commissioners: the 
Commissioner for the Budget and the Commissioner for Regional Policy. Both are 
agenda setters in their respective realm, and responsible for EU funds. Regional pol-
icy is closely related to two structural funds: the European Social Fund (ESF) and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The allocation of these funds is to 
a larger degree based on formal criteria, however, and the regional Commissioner’s 
portfolio cannot be separated from the portfolios of other Commissioners as clear-
ly.13 Schneider (2013, 466) explains that “since ERDF/ESF transfers are allocated 
on a project-level basis, states are more restricted in their annual negotiations to 
move around already stipulated funds.”
The budget Commissioner rather has an influence on the allocation of budgets 
toward the individual budget items than on the distribution across member states and 
only limited room to maneuver with respect to annual budgets, due to the  constraints 
11 We do not discuss the general welfare implications of this controversial redistributive policy here. Whether 
and why more market-based approaches and less pork-barrel politics could lead to welfare improvements is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Evidence that more reliance on market forces does not only lead to higher growth rates, but 
also relates to higher subjective well-being is, for example, presented by Gehring (2013). 
12 Before the Lisbon-Treaty (2007), the European Parliament had little influence on budget decisions in the 
field of CAP (see, e.g., Crombez and Swinnen 2011; Schneider 2013). The official press releases and more details 
about the decisions in the Agricultural Council can be found at http://aei.pitt.edu/view/instauthor/IAC002.html, last 
accessed on May 22, 2016. The minutes of the Council meetings reveal, for instance, that adaptions to the pricing 
system were made in several subsequent meetings from June to October 1985. In this and other cases, subsidies on 
very specific products have often been considered in succeeding meetings. This demonstrates that most meetings 
had the potential to influence the spending structure of the EAGGF. 
13 For example, one criterion is that “to be eligible for most of the ERDF/ESF resources, the per capita GDP of 
the country has to fall below 75 percent of the average GDP in the EU” (Schneider 2013). For further details on the 
funds and criteria for the ERDF and ESF fund see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/ and http://
ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1, last accessed on May 23, 2016. 
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set by the longer term multi-annual financial frameworks of the EU.14 In contrast, 
the agricultural Commissioner should be able to influence budget distribution deci-
sions within the predefined available agricultural budget to a much higher degree 
along the lines suggested above. Hence, while we expect similar relationships for 
other Commissioners, the Commissioner for Agriculture is the best option to empir-
ically identify the relationship between national background and Commissioners’ 
behavior.
III. Data and Empirical Strategy
A. Data
In the following section, we describe our variables of interest and give a brief 
description of the relevant control variables. Since the EU has undergone several 
enlargement rounds, the length of time that is covered depends on the respective 
country’s timing of joining the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are not included as their 
one year of membership from 2005–2006 does not allow for an estimation with 
country fixed-effects. We thus analyze a nonbalanced panel for a maximum of 
25 countries (see Online Appendix A4, Figure 2).
As dependent variables, we are interested in the share of the EU budget that a 
particular country  i receives at time  t . Our main variable and the focus of our paper 
is the EAGGF budget that country  i receives as a percentage of the total EU budget. 
The budget shares are derived from the annual reports of the European Court of 
Auditors and range from 1979 to 2006. At present, there exists no comprehensive 
information for more recent years.15 We use the share to be able to easily disen-
tangle changes in the overall budget sizes from changes in relative allocation. This 
way of measuring negotiation success is more robust when examining a total budget 
that changed over the course of time (Aksoy 2010; Butzen, De Prest, and Geeroms 
2006).16 In addition to our focus on shares of the agricultural funds, we also test 
14 The multi-annual financial frameworks of the EU act as a severe constraint and are negotiated by the heads of 
governments for seven (previously five) years. In the multi-annual budget negotiations, the member states “outline 
EU spending by setting ceilings on expenditures for each budget category and on total expenditure” (Schneider 
2013, 465). Thus, relating annual overall budget data to the budget Commissioner will most likely not provide 
enough variation to detect a significant relationship. There have been three frameworks within our sample period, 
Delors I (1988–1992), Delors II (1993–1999), and Agenda 2000 (2000–2006). See for details http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/atyoursevice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.5.3.html, last accessed on May 23, 2016. The frame-
works do not determine the allocation per country within the agricultural budget. 
15 The EAGGF was replaced by two follow-up funds in 2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_en.htm, 
last accessed on April 16, 2015). This is the main reason that our sample ends in 2007. As one of these funds, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) co-finances economic rural development programs 
of the member states (see http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/funding-opportunities/index_en.htm, last 
accessed on April 22, 2015), it is more difficult to directly trace its changes back to the actions of the Commissioner 
for Agriculture. It pursues goals similar to those of the cohesion and regional funds and might thus be influenced by 
other Commissioners as well. Specifically, it mostly “co-finances the rural development programs of the Member 
States” (see http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/funding-opportunities/index_en.htm, last accessed on 
May 20, 2015). Compare Schneider (2013) for a short description of the data sources. 
16 Within the scope of this paper, we disregard contractual amendments which altered the distribution of power 
between the EU’s three main organs and changed the budgetary procedures. Crombez and Hix (2011), for instance, 
argue that under qualified majority voting, it should be easier for the commission to push its interest through by 
focusing on pivotal member states. The length of our sample, however, does not offer enough statistical power to 
make valid estimations for sub-periods. See Crombez (2000), Thomson and Hosli (2006), and Aksoy (2010) for 
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whether similar relationships exist for the overall budget and the regional and social 
fund. For a robustness test, we also use the EAGGF budget that country  i receives 
as a percentage of the total agricultural budget as well as its total budget share as a 
percentage of the total EU budget.
Our variable of interest is the nationality of the respective Commissioner. 
We use multiple sources (see Online Appendix A2) to gather the terms of the 
EU Commissioners for agriculture over our sample period. We code a vari-
able  Commissioner that contains the share of a year that country  i provides this 
Commissioner (measured by months in office). Online Appendix A2 also shows 
the respective appointment and resignation dates of all Commissioners during our 
sample period. With few exceptions,  Commissioner has the nature of a binary vari-
able (being one, if the member state appoints the Commissioner in a certain year 
and zero otherwise), because commissions were usually replaced in January. The 
average tenure of office is three years. For additional tests, we also code variables 
Commissioner (B) and  Commissioner (r) for the EU Commissioner for the Budget 
and the Commissioner for Regional Policy, respectively.
For reasons of transparency and to allow comparability with the existing liter-
ature, we do not propose our own set of control variables but rather adopt those 
in Schneider (2013). It is based on EU distribution principles (see, e.g., Bouvet 
and Dall’Erba 2010) as well as on previous findings in the literature. Note that our 
results hold when adding the changes or lags of this comprehensive set of control 
variables in addition. Online Appendix A3 provides the exact definitions and data 
sources. For our identification strategy it is most important that the controls condi-
tion on the most likely selection mechanisms.
Election year and Preelection year are binary variables that account for the years 
before and during domestic elections, which could relate to receiving “supportive” 
financial flows. Most importantly for us, we need to control for factors that could 
directly relate to receiving the agricultural Commissioner: States with higher unem-
ployment, a lower development, and higher dependence on agriculture might be 
more likely to provide the Commissioner. We use data for Unemployment rate, Per 
Capita GDP (EU=100) (100 equals the EU average), Employment Agriculture (ln) 
(measuring the number of people employed in the agricultural sector as a natural 
logarithm in millions), and the gross value added from the agricultural sector, GVA 
Agriculture, from Eurostat and the World Bank to account for selection on these 
observables. GVA Agriculture is added to the set of covariates used in the related 
literature due to our focus on agricultural payments, but note that none of our results 
is strongly affected by its inclusion. We also use data from Eurobarometer to mea-
sure Domestic EU Support. The EU might be more likely to grant a member state 
the agricultural Commissioner and increased budget shares if there is a high share 
of eurosceptics in the electorate.
consequences of the particular treaties, voting rules, and the differences between “consultation” and “co-decision” 
procedures, and Heinemann (2003) for an investigation of the political economy of EU enlargement and treaty 
amendments. 
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Bargaining power in the EU Council is quantified using the Shapley-Shubik index 
with the variable Voting Power Council.17 New member State is a binary variable for 
all new members until the next enlargement round of the EU, which is coded as one 
if a country is a new member in this period and zero otherwise. It accounts for the 
fact that new members receive lower budget shares initially because of their infe-
rior administrative capacity and less developed bargaining experience in attracting 
a share of the funds (Plümper and Schneider 2007). Due to the enlargement rounds, 
the budget shares that single member states receive decrease over time. European 
Council Presidency captures whether a country holds the temporary chair of the 
EU Council and EC President whether a country provides the President of the EU 
Commission. These factors together capture the most important observable selec-
tion variables. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
B. Empirical Strategy
Our main estimation equation is
  y i, t = β  c i, t +  X i, t ′ γ +  ϑ i +  τ t +  ϵ i, t ,
where  y i, t is the budget share country  i gets in year  t ,  c i, t is the variable for appointing 
the Commissioner for Agriculture,  X i, t represents the vector of control variables,  ϑ i 
are fixed-effects for country  i ,  τ t indicate time dummies, and  ϵ i, t is an error term. In 
17 For the exact calculation of the power indices see Bräuninger and König (2005). 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Agricultural Fund Share 385 3.90 3.89 0.00 17.49
Agricultural Fund Share (100) 385 7.26 6.81 0.00 27.46
Overall Funds Share 385 6.00 5.22 0.02 20.84
Commissioner 385 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Commissioner (Binary) 385 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Commissioner (B) 385 0.07 0.24 0.00 1.00
Commissioner (r) 385 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Time in Office 385 0.26 1.11 0.00 9.83
Preelection year 385 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Election year 385 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Employment Agriculture (ln) 385 5.60 1.58 0.99 8.01
GVA Agriculture 385 3.78 2.80 0.38 14.35
Unemployment rate 385 8.29 3.64 0.70 21.30
Per Capita GDP (EU=100) 385 100.12 41.41 23.05 301.18
New member State 385 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Voting Power Council 385 7.26 4.69 0.90 17.86
Domestic EU Support 385 45.76 22.88 −30.00 86.00
Council Presidency 385 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
EC President 385 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Notes: The observations are restricted to the sample from Table 2 based on the joint availability 
of the variables. N = number of observations, Mean = arithmetic mean, SD = standard devia-
tion, Min = minimum value, Max = maximum value.
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addition, we add year dummies ( τ t ) and country dummies ( δ t ) that account for unob-
servable year-specific and country-specific variation that might bias the estimate of 
c i, t .18 Thus, the strategy is comparable to a difference-in-differences equation, and 
relies on the assumption of common trends between treated and untreated states to 
establish a causal relationship. For the standard errors, we use two-way clustering 
at the country and year level (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011; Schaffer 2010; 
Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2010). Since the dependent variable is a share out of 
all member states, there necessarily exists correlation across observations at each 
point in time, which makes it important to cluster on years as well. Additionally, we 
also display results for alternative bootstrap and randomization-based approaches 
to inference.
Figure 2 gives a first idea of the relationship by plotting the predicted fund shares 
of the treated countries versus their actual shares around the time of providing the 
Commissioner. This descriptive graph suggests an increase during the time when a 
country provides the Commissioner (bold/red segments), and a subsequent decline 
after leaving office. We now turn to our regression evidence to quantify the extent 
and significance of this apparent deviation.
18 The working paper version of this paper (Gehring and Schneider 2016) also shows results using  panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE). They are also positive, similar in coefficient size, and significant at the 1 percent level. 
3
2
1
0
−1
−5 0 5 10 15
Years
A
ct
ua
l −
 p
re
di
ct
ed
 s
ha
re
s
Latvia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Commissioner
in office
Austria
Denmark I
Denmark II
Ireland
Figure 2. Budget Share of Treated Countries Centered around Year of Taking Office
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the difference between the predicted and the actually 
observed budget shares of the respective country. Predictions are based on a regression on the 
observable control variables as defined in Table 2, column 4, country and year fixed-effects, as 
well as country-specific time trends. The lines provide nonparametric approximations to the 
development within the countries and the bold/red segments signal the period during which 
the respective country provided the Commissioner. All observations are centered around the 
start of the treatment (year when taking office), so that the zero on the horizontal axis indicates 
the year in which a country starts providing the Commissioner for Agriculture.
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IV. Results
A. main results
Table 2 shows the main results for the 1979–2006 period. Column 1 shows 
a simple specification that includes only the control variables. As expected, 
Employment Agriculture (ln) and GVA Agriculture both indicate a positive relation-
ship between the importance of the agricultural sector and budget receipts, and the 
latter coefficient is statistically significant. This relationship disappears when intro-
ducing country and time fixed-effects and the  Commissioner variable in column 2. 
The main explanation for this is that conditional on the fixed-effects there is insuf-
ficient variation in the importance of agriculture over time within countries. Our 
main interest is the coefficient for  Commissioner , which is 0.925 and significant at 
the 1 percent level. Having the EU Commissioner for Agriculture is thus associated 
with an increase in the share of the overall EU budget obtained by the respective 
country of approximately 1 percentage point. This change relates on average to an 
increase of about 25 percent in the agricultural receipts for the home country and 
would translate to 850 million EUR per year (for a fictive average sized country), 
based on the 2006 EU budget.
However, using general year dummies and country fixed-effects might not capture 
all unobserved variation over time. To resolve this matter, we add  country-specific 
time trends in addition to the year dummies to account for changes in the share of 
agricultural funds within a country over the sample period. If sectoral changes in 
the industrial structure of individual countries lead to less money being allocated 
to these countries, this could bias our results if it coincides with providing the EU 
Commissioner. In fact, adding the trends leads to a decrease in the coefficient to 
0.557 in column 3. The estimate becomes more precise, however, and the standard 
error decreases, which again leads to a rejection of the null-hypothesis of no rela-
tionship at the 1 percent level.
One might argue that other influential EU positions can also be misused to guide 
money to the respective countries of origin. The most prominent and influential 
positions are the EC President and the alternating EU Council Presidency, which 
could both theoretically be related to the share of funds received. Adding these 
two variables in column 4 does not affect the coefficient, which remains stable and 
significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, in this most conservative specification, 
providing the Commissioner for Agriculture is still related to about 0.5 percentage 
points higher fund shares. This is our preferred estimation, which we use for all 
further tests. Hence, we conclude that our baseline estimates of the relationship 
between providing the EU Commissioner for Agriculture and the share received by 
the respective country of origin are robustly positive and significant. It is also eco-
nomically significant. The coefficient of 0.557 would translate into an increase in 
allocations of about 510 million euro per year. This is a substantive amount, partic-
ularly for smaller member states. For example, Denmark’s overall EU fund receipts 
sum up to 1,455 million euro.
Columns 6 and 7 provide further robustness checks regarding the choice of the 
dependent variable. Column 6 uses the agricultural fund receipts of country i as 
228 AmErICAN ECONOmIC JOUrNAL: ECONOmIC POLICy FEBrUAry 2018
a share of the agricultural budget instead of the total EU budget. As one would 
expect, the coefficient becomes larger and remains significant at the 5 percent 
level. Column 7 uses the overall budget share that country  i receives instead of 
only looking at the agricultural receipts. The reason for this test is that we want 
to evaluate whether there is some kind of balancing mechanism where countries 
lose the amount gained in the agricultural budget in other sectors. This is not the 
Table 2—Regression Results
Dependent variable AFS AFS AFS AFS AFS(100) OFS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commissioner — 0.925 0.557 0.557 0.784 0.866
[0.287] [0.150] [0.154] [0.327] [0.203]
Preelection year 0.028 0.072 0.051 0.039 0.068 0.140
[0.155] [0.099] [0.093] [0.087] [0.099] [0.139]
Election year −0.101 −0.012 0.059 0.045 0.085 0.094
[0.113] [0.117] [0.115] [0.110] [0.168] [0.140]
Employment Agriculture (ln) 0.384 −0.812 −0.014 −0.037 −0.116 −0.621
[0.328] [1.049] [0.528] [0.516] [0.859] [0.716]
GVA Agriculture 0.187 0.007 −0.092 −0.090 0.064 −0.140
[0.081] [0.084] [0.093] [0.090] [0.155] [0.129]
Per Capita GDP (EU=100) 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.017 0.038 0.034
[0.012] [0.005] [0.011] [0.011] [0.018] [0.020]
Unemployment rate 0.040 −0.020 0.040 0.039 0.101 0.095
[0.065] [0.060] [0.031] [0.030] [0.038] [0.059]
Voting Power Council 0.615 0.351 0.350 0.346 0.494 0.624
[0.122] [0.129] [0.109] [0.109] [0.171] [0.240]
Domestic EU Support 0.015 0.009 −0.011 −0.011 −0.023 −0.015
[0.014] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.016] [0.012]
New member State −0.640 −1.948 −0.569 −0.570 −0.450 −1.099
[0.588] [0.395] [0.240] [0.235] [0.389] [0.484]
Council Presidency — — — −0.135 −0.182 −0.041
[0.107] [0.184] [0.138]
EC President — — — 0.040 −0.175 −0.197
[0.139] [0.290] [0.355]
Country fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specifc time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value — 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000
WCRB p-value (2-point) — 0.005 0.010 0.011 0.102 0.007
WCRB p-value (6-point) — 0.023 0.034 0.032 0.202 0.018
RI p-value ( β ) — 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.002
RI p-value (t) — 0.018 0.008 0.010 0.093 0.011
Adj. r2 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.60 0.62
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. AFS refers to Agricultural Fund 
Share, the agricultural fund receipts of a country as a share of the overall EU budget. AFS(100) refers to Agricultural 
Fund Share (100), the agricultural fund receipts of a country as a share of the overall EU agricultural budget. OFS 
refers to Overall Funds Share, the overall budget share of a country. The standard errors are multiway-clustered 
to allow for arbitrary correlation at the country and year level using the xtivreg2 command in Stata. The sample 
runs from 1979–2006 in all regressions. “Country-specific time trends” refers to a set of linear time trends that are 
allowed to vary by country. The control variables are explained in the text in more detail and our main variable of 
interest is Commissioner. “p-value” is based on a standard Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of 
Commissioner equals 0 using xtivreg2. WCRB p-values refer to the same hypothesis test using the wild-cluster 
restricted bootstrap and RI p-values to the hypothesis test using randomization inference.
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case. The coefficient remains comparable in size and remains significant at the 
1 percent level.19
Online Appendix A5 shows that there is no significant interaction term between 
time in office and the treatment. However, as the associated figure shows, the interac-
tion term is positive and the marginal effect increases the longer the Commissioners 
stay in office. It seems plausible that the Commissioner needs some time to adjust 
the budget distribution mechanism according to his preferences.
With a binary variable for Commissioner and year fixed-effects we can evaluate 
the common trend assumption that is necessary for a causal interpretation of the esti-
mated coefficient. While using country-specific time trends alleviates endogeneity 
concerns, nonlinear country-specific trends could still bias our estimations. In our 
multi-period setting, we can test this assumption by examining whether different 
pretreatment or posttreatment trends exist for treated and untreated countries that 
would indicate nonrandom selection. Our theoretical considerations suggest that the 
Commissioners are able to affect budget allocation in favor of their home country 
only once they are in office. Significant lead-variables would thus cast doubts on the 
causal interpretation of our earlier results. Significant lags are theoretically possible 
and not implausible; the Commissioners could either install staff that supports their 
cause even after their dismissal or change internal processes or rules that take some 
time to reverse.
We thus code two lead variables, which take the value one only in the year  (t − 1) 
and two years  (t − 2) before a country provides the Commissioner, and zero oth-
erwise. For posttrends, we code four lag variables that take the value one for one 
year after leaving office  (t + 1) up to four years after leaving office  (t + 4) , and 
zero otherwise.20 Table 3 depicts the results including different leads and lags. The 
specification is otherwise identical to our preferred specification above and includes 
the same controls. We estimate  y i, t = α + β  c i, t +  ∑ φ=−2 4 ( β t+φ  c i, t+φ ) +  X i, t ′ γ + ϑ i +  τ t +  ϵ i, t , with the binary indicator used for  c i, t and with  X i, t including linear 
country-specific time trends.
In column 1, it can be seen that both added lead variables remain insignificant, 
whereas the coefficient for Commissioner (t) increases marginally to 0.544 and 
remains significant at the 1 percent level. Column 2 adds lags instead of leads. 
Again, all the lag variables are far from conventional significance levels, while 
Commissioner (t) increases to 0.731 and remains significant at the 1 percent level. 
Finally, column 3 adds all leads and lags. The coefficient for Commissioner (t) 
becomes 0.728, again significant at the 1 percent level. All leads and lags are 
19 The budget Commissioner and Commissioner for Regional Policy positions might be used to redirect 
funds to their respective home countries as well. Yet, as outlined above, we do not expect to find a relationship in 
these cases. Online Appendix A8, Table 9, columns 6 and 7 show results for the variables  Commissioner (B) and 
Commissioner (r) to test for a relationship with the overall budget share and the regional and social fund’s share 
of the respective country of origin. As expected, we find no significant relationship.  Commissioner (B) relates to a 
coefficient of −0.111 and  Commissioner (r) to 0.102, and both are far from conventional significance levels. The 
most probable explanation is that there is either not enough leeway associated with these positions, the multi-annual 
financial framework restricts their room for maneuver, or there is too much noise in the data to be able to identify 
a significant relationship. 
20 We assign the one for the lag variables only for those years after the country stopped providing the 
Commissioner in (t + 1), i.e., where we correctly identify posttreatment trends after providing the Commissioner. 
The variable  Commissioner(t) takes on the value of one in all years in which the country provides the Commissioner. 
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 insignificant, giving no indication of pre- and posttreatment trends, while 
Commissioner (t) remains significant throughout.21
Figure 3 illustrates this graphically. The squares indicate the coefficient and the 
gray-shaded area the 95 percent confidence interval. It can be easily seen from the 
confidence-band that all leads and lags are far from being significantly different 
from zero. The graph shows that the increase in fund shares occurs only during the 
time in office, remains positive but indistinguishable from zero in the two years 
directly after the appointment of a new Commissioner from a different member 
state, and reverts back to zero in  (t + 3) . This is a crucial result for the causal inter-
pretation of the identified relationship, as differences in trends were the most serious 
concern. The next part will shortly present further sensitivity tests and an assessment 
of the robustness of the coefficient to selection-on-unobservables.
21 The same holds true when using the lags and leads individually as can be seen in the Online Appendix A7, 
Table 6 and Table 7. Only the contemporanous value reaches significance. 
Table 3—Pretreatment and Posttreatment Trends
Dependent variable AFS AFS AFS
(1) (2) (3)
Commissioner (t − 2) −0.156 — −0.058
[0.291] [0.196]
Commissioner (t − 1) −0.082 — 0.015
[0.377] [0.289]
Commissioner 0.544 0.731 0.728
[0.145] [0.256] [0.240]
Commissioner (t + 1) — 0.780 0.778
[0.660] [0.651]
Commissioner (t + 2) — 0.579 0.577
[0.395] [0.385]
Commissioner (t + 3) — 0.222 0.216
[0.166] [0.141]
Commissioner (t + 4) — 0.257 0.255
[0.267] [0.241]
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.002
WCRB p-value (2-point) 0.009 0.003 0.001
WCRB p-value (6-point) 0.042 0.039 0.034
RI p-value ( β ) 0.000 0.000 0.000
RI p-value (t) 0.035 0.041 0.031
Adj. r2 0.78 0.78 0.78
Observations 385 385 385
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors 
in brackets. AFS refers to Agricultural Fund Share. All columns use the 
fixed-effects within estimator. Standard errors are multiway-clustered 
to allow for arbitrary correlation at the country and year level using the 
xtivreg2 command in Stata. The controls include all control variables in 
Table 2, column 4. This includes country and year fixed-effects, as well as 
country-specific time trends. The time trends comprise a set of linear time 
trends that are allowed to vary by country. WCRB refers to wild-cluster 
restricted bootstrap and RI to randomization inference. Tables 6 and 7 in the 
Online Appendix show that the results are robust to including all lead- and 
lag-variables individually.
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B. Bootstrapping and Placebo Tests
There are several potential problems with statistical inference in cases where 
clusters are imbalanced, the number of clusters is small, or the share of treated 
units within the clusters is rather small (a comprehensive summary is provided by 
Cameron and Miller 2015). In such cases, using clustered standard errors could still 
lead to over- or underrejection of the null hypothesis (Cameron and Miller 2015; 
MacKinnon and Webb 2016, 2017).
The most recommended procedure to approach this issue is the so-called “wild 
cluster bootstrap.” Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) use simulation evidence to 
demonstrate that the wild cluster bootstrap with the null hypothesis imposed pro-
vides valid inference—even with cluster sizes significantly smaller than 50—under 
many circumstances typical to applied research. Additionally, we draw bootstrap 
samples not only based on the common 2-point distribution, but also based on a 
6-point distribution, which can alleviate problems with few clusters (Webb 2013). In 
this approach, the weights take on any of the values  {− √ ___ 1.5, − √ __ 1, − √ ___ 0.5,  √ ___ 0.5, 
 √ __ 1,  √ ___ 1.5} with the same likelihood. Finally, we also compute p-values with a 
simulation-based randomization inference procedure following Conley and Taber 
(2011) and MacKinnon and Webb (2016).
The wild cluster bootstrap should be the most reliable and conservative approach 
in our case. Simulation results comparing the reliability of different methods show 
that it provides reliable inference even under unusual circumstances (Cameron 
and Miller 2015). Regarding problems with differing cluster sizes, MacKinnon 
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Figure 3. Leads and Lags
Notes: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals are based on Table 3, column 3. The 
squares indicate the coefficient and the shaded area the 95 percent confidence interval. The 
interval is based on standard errors that are multiway-clustered to allow for arbitrary correla-
tion at the country and year level using the xtivreg2 command in Stata.
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and Webb (2017) show that it tends to reject correctly once the number of treated 
observations within the cluster is greater than 5 or less than 95 percent. This con-
dition is fulfilled in our case. MacKinnon and Webb (2017) also demonstrate 
that the restricted procedure leads to more conservative p-values than an unre-
stricted approach that does not impose the Null, and performs “extremely well” 
for five or more clusters. We thus use the restricted wild cluster bootstrap (WCRB) 
(MacKinnon and Webb 2017; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008; Davidson and 
MacKinnon 1999).
An alternative to the WCRB approach is randomization inference (see Conley 
and Taber 2011), which tackles inference problems that can arise when the number 
of treated observations is small. Our setting is not exactly equivalent to theirs, as the 
share of countries that receive the treatment at least once is 6 out of 25 countries, 
hence, not “small” in the original definition of Conley and Taber (2011). While the 
number of untreated control countries cannot be assumed to approach infinity as 
in their setting, we can still adapt the approach to learn something about the sensi-
tivity of our results. Based on Conley and Taber (2011) and MacKinnon and Webb 
(2016), we thus programmed a routine that computes p-values based on randomiza-
tion inference. More specifically, our approach is most similar to the wild bootstrap 
randomization inference procedure in MacKinnon and Webb (2016), section 2.9. 
We refer the reader to the original papers for more details. A detailed description of 
the steps we conduct is provided in Online Appendix A6.
The intuition behind this approach is to randomly assign the treatment to the con-
trol countries. Online Appendix Figure 12 gives an idea of this as it shows placebo 
effects for each untreated country individually. Subsequently, we follow Conley 
and Taber (2011) and partial out time and country dummies from the outcome as 
well as the treatment variable to resemble their original approach. In addition, we 
adjust for the effect of the treatment and the control variables on the outcome to 
form residuals for each state. We then create new samples in each bootstrap round 
by drawing from the treatment vectors and assigning them randomly to the state 
residuals. In each of these bootstrap samples, we regress the randomized treatment 
on the residuals and store the coefficient and t-value. Finally, the distribution of 
the coefficient estimates  β boot and t-values  t boot is used to compute the p-value. 
With a symmetric test, this p-value reflects the fraction of times that  |  β boot | > |  β m | , or more formally  p ˆboot ∗ =  1 __B  ∑ b=1 B I (|  β boot | > |  β m |) . Bootstrapping the 
t-value, which offers asymptotic refinement, analogously yields the p-value as 
 p ˆboot ∗ =  1 __B  ∑ b=1 B I (|  t boot | > |  t m |) . For more details see, among others, Cameron 
and Miller (2015).
Figure 4 illustrates the derivation of the p-value graphically for randomization 
inference. Analogous to Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), it shows the cumulative 
distribution of the simulated placebo treatment coefficients versus the actual treat-
ment effect. As can be seen, only a tiny share of simulated coefficients is larger than 
the “real” treatment effect we measure. Overall, all estimated p-values with 5 dif-
ferent approaches are below standard values indicating statistical significance in 38 
out of 40 cases. This increases our confidence that neither the number of clusters 
nor the relatively rare treatment is problematic for correct statistical inference in this 
specific case.
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C. Sensitivity Tests and Identification of Causal Effects
So far, we have demonstrated that the positive relationship between  Commissioner 
and Agricultural Fund Share is robust to a large array of different specifications, 
including the usage of country-specific time trends to alleviate concerns about the 
common trend assumption. Online Appendix A8, Table 9 displays further robustness 
tests. Specifically, it shows that the main result is robust to including higher order 
time trends and the change in the control variables in addition to the levels. Moreover, 
the results using a log-version of the dependent variable are in line with prior results.
The prior section showed that several alternative approaches to statistical infer-
ence support the significant result. Still, we also have to consider that due to the 
relatively low number of Commissioners an individual country could have a strong 
influence on the estimation results. Instead of using one of the various methods to 
identify potential outliers, which all involve some arbitrary choices and assump-
tions, we opt for a more conservative option. We rerun our preferred specification 
(Table 2, column 4), and leave out each of the treated countries in the sample once.
Table 4, panel A shows that the results are not driven by individual countries. 
The top row indicates which country is left out in the estimations. Depending on the 
time of their EU access, this leads to different numbers of observations. We can see 
that the coefficient takes on values between 0.411 (omitting the Netherlands) and 
0.683 (omitting Ireland), but remains significant at the 1 percent level in all cases. 
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Figure 4. Simulated Placebo Treatment Coefficients
Notes: Displays coefficient size on the horizontal axis and the empirical cumulative distri-
bution function on the vertical axis. The vertical line represents the true treatment effect in 
our most conservative specification. The curve is not an interpolation; it looks smooth due 
to the high number of repetitions (10,000). Note that for the computation of the p-value with 
a  two-sided test, we add up all coefficient values larger in absolute value than the treatment 
effect. Online Appendix Figures 4 and 5 show other variants of this graph, which clarify this 
computation by plotting coefficient density and absolute values of the coefficient estimates.
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In addition, a sample without larger countries should exhibit a smaller selection 
bias as it excludes some countries that have a lower likelihood of being interested in 
the agricultural Commissioner post. When omitting the largest countries with more 
than 40 million inhabitants, the relationship remains stable and significant at the 
5 percent level. As Online Appendix Figure 9 shows, the results are also robust to a 
procedure that randomly leaves out individual control variables and countries, and 
repeats this exercise 10,000 times. The resulting distribution of p-values shows that 
an overwhelming share of p-values retains a value of 0.02 or less.
The fact that no form of selection-on-observables affects the estimations increases 
our confidence in the interpretation of the results. To be sure that we can give it a 
causal interpretation, it is still desirable to assess the likelihood that our results can 
be explained by selection-on-unobservables. We first apply the methods developed 
in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) to assess how much larger the selection-bias 
based on unobserved factors would have to be compared to observed factors to fully 
explain our results. The strategy is to use selection-on-observables to assess the 
severity of potential selection bias for the results. We compare two kinds of regres-
sions: one which contains only country and year fixed-effects (ℒ = limited) to 
one with a full set of controls (ℱ = full).  ℱ 1 comprises all variables from Table 2, 
Table 4—Robustness to Outliers and Sensitivity to Selection-on-Unobservables
Panel A. Omitted country DEN IRE LUX NED AUT LAT 
Large 
countries
Commissioner 0.572 0.683 0.591 0.411 0.555 0.561 0.440
[0.216] [0.209] [0.180] [0.101] [0.158] [0.155] [0.181]
Adj. r2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.82
Observations 357 357 357 357 373 382 252
Panel B
Controls in the 
 limited set
Controls in the  
 full set
 β ℒ  β ℱ Sr =  |  β ℱ /( β ℒ −  β ℱ ) |
Identified 
β-set
Country FE Country FE 0.43 0.92 1.89 [0.92; 1.50]
Year FE Year FE 
Control variables
Country FE Country FE 0.43 0.56 4.48 [0.56; 0.61]
Year FE Year FE 
Control variables 
Time trends
Notes: Panel A displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is Agricultural 
Fund Share. Standard errors are multiway-clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at the country and year level 
using the xtivreg2 command in Stata. All regressions include the control variables from Table 2, column 4. This 
includes country and year fixed-effects, as well as country-specific time trends. The time trends comprise a set of 
linear time trends that are allowed to vary by country. DEN = Denmark, IRE = Ireland, LUX = Luxembourg, 
NED = Netherlands, AUT = Austria, LAT = Latvia. Large countries include Germany, France, United Kingdom, 
Italy, Spain. Panel B reports regression coefficients for Commissioner and selection ratios (SR) based on the for-
mula depicted.  β ℒ refers to the coefficient of Commissioner from a model that contains only country and year 
 fixed-effects and  β ℱ to the coefficient of Commissioner from a model containing all control variables and coun-
try-specific time trends in addition to these fixed-effects. The selection ratio indicates the extent of remaining selec-
tion bias due to unobservables relative to the observable variables in the model that would be necessary to drive the 
treatment effect down to 0. Control variables include all variables from Table 2, column 4. A detailed definition of 
the identified set is provided in the main text. The set is well identified if it does not include 0 (see also Oster 2013).
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column 3, and  ℱ 2 adds the country-specific linear time trends, i.e., responds to our 
most restrictive specification. Panel B of Table 4, shows the “Selection ratio” ( Sr ), 
the ratio of selection-on-unobservables to observables necessary to fully explain our 
coefficients. In simple terms: how likely is a bias due to unobserved time-variant 
factors captured neither by the controls nor the country-specific time trends? The 
resulting ratios indicate that for {ℒ,  ℱ 1 }, selection-on-unobservables would have to 
be 1.9 times as large as selection-on-observables to fully explain the positive rela-
tionship of the fund’s share with the Commissioner for Agriculture. It rises to nearly 
five times for the {ℒ,  ℱ 2 } combination, which takes the linear country-specific time 
trends into account as well.
Generally, we are less concerned by selection-on-unobservables if the coef-
ficient moves further away from zero or shows only small changes toward zero 
when adding observables. However, Oster (2013) explains that small changes in 
the coefficient only help in coming closer to a causal interpretation if the added 
variables also explain additional variation in the dependent variable. She argues 
that  r max ∈ [ r ℱ , 1] and  δ ∈ [0, 1] are plausible boundaries for the maximum 
share of the variance that can be systematically explained and the relationship of 
selection-on-unobservables to observables. For simplicity, we use the most conser-
vative setting with  r max = 1 and  δ = 1 .
We then calculate the boundary of the set  β ∗ =  β ℱ − δ 
×  ( β ℒ −  β ℱ ) × ( r max −  r ℱ )   ________________( r ℱ −  r ℒ ) and the identified set  Δ s = [  β ℱ ,  β ∗ ] ∀  β ℱ ≤  β ∗ ⋀ Δ s = [ β ∗ ,  β ℱ ] ∀  β ℱ >  β ∗ . As adding observables moves the coefficient of 
Commissioner further away from zero, our sets of identified coefficients is [0.92; 
1.50] and [0.56; 0.61]; far from including zero. This is strong evidence that even with 
the most conservative choice of the suggested boundaries, our full set is precisely 
estimated within the confidence intervals and does not include zero. Overall, we find 
no plausible explanation that holds as an argument against a causal interpretation of 
the identified relationship.
V. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this study was to examine whether and to what extent the national 
background of political leaders influences budget allocation decisions in a suprana-
tional institution like the European Union, which is in a continuous struggle about 
the optimal level of integration.22 The role of the European Commission is at the 
center of this debate. As an institution, it combines features of an unelected bureau-
cracy with significant executive powers. Against this background, examining the 
degree to which decisions of Commissioners, are shaped by their respective national 
background is an important research question. Our results provide further support 
22 Janeba and Wilson (2011) model the optimal division of public good provision in a federal system with 
tax competition and show that, while some goods should be centrally provided, complete centralization is never 
desirable for all public goods. Dreher et al. (2017) point at the role that differences in “soft” private information 
between the different layers in a federal system play in explaining the choice of sub-optimal decentralization levels. 
They also highlight that whether the upper or lower layers constitute the “principal” in the principal-agent structure 
determines how much information is shared and to what extent decision making is in equilibrium decentralized. 
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for the influence of individual backgrounds in bureaucracies and executives both at 
the national and supranational level.
Our focus was on the agricultural Commissioners, who fulfill all necessary 
requirements to reliably test the impact of national background. The findings indi-
cate that providing the Commissioner for Agriculture is related to increases of about 
1 percentage point in the share of the overall EU budget that the country of origin 
receives. We remain cautious, but despite an extensive series of tests could not find 
compelling reasons against a causal interpretation. While omitted variables should 
always be a concern, alternative explanations based on unobserved factors would 
have to assume an improbably high impact of omitted variables given the sensitiv-
ity to controlling for observable factors and the remaining variation in the depen-
dent variable (Oster forthcoming). Hence, the results suggest that providing the EU 
Commissioner for Agriculture leads to increases in a country’s budget receipts.
This finding cannot necessarily be extrapolated to all other Commissioners and 
political actors in the EU. Nevertheless, it presents clear and quantitatively rele-
vant evidence that national background continues to matter in the EU. Finding this 
robust and highly significant relationship here changes the a priori assumptions 
about whether similar relationships also exists for other Commissioners, where a 
lack of data and transparency does not allow us to quantify them. This supports 
prior research on the role of individual background in international organiza-
tions or federal systems. It is important to note that the results do not rule out that 
Commissioners also take common European values and targets into account and are 
motivated by other motives or a European spirit.
Taking the interest of a particular group of constituents into account can be 
an intended feature of democratic institutions, in particular in legislatures with 
first-past-the-post systems. In such systems, the fact that elected politicians distrib-
ute more money to their home region might not necessarily be undesirable. Still, we 
would argue that the executive branch of government should internalize diverging 
regional preferences and aim at maximizing the common good. At the very least, 
this is the claim that the EU Commission itself actively communicates.
Thus, while we remain agnostic about the normative assessment, the result pro-
vides good reasons to reform the commission before assigning it more executive 
powers. At the same time, our findings should not be used to neglect the benefits of 
the EU, which is one of the most impressive political and economic projects in the 
realm of international cooperation of the last half-century. Instead, we hope to raise 
awareness for a discussion about the need to adapt and refine the political structures 
as well as the relationship between member states and central authorities. This is 
upon the most pressing issues in the EU and does not yet receive the attention it 
deserves.
The political discussion in the European Union should not ignore economic 
and social realities for the sake of avoiding political controversies and difficult but 
much-needed debates. There is now an impressive amount of evidence that the 
national or regional background of politicians and unelected bureaucratic actors still 
shapes their decision-making when working at an international level. This should be 
taken into account by designing mechanisms that minimize common pool problems 
and the ability of individual actors and countries to overproportionally exert their 
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influence. The current system that allocates one Commissioner per member state 
implicitly institutionalizes a system of mutual dependence. Instead, the number of 
Commissioners should be based on efficiency concerns and selection be decoupled 
from national origin and rather based on the quality of the candidates. Finally, to 
regain lost confidence, the EU should ensure more transparency about voting pat-
terns and internal decisions, so that the public, media, and science can provide the 
checks and balances necessary in a democratic system.
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